Russia and Ukraine: Is the European Union finally re-joining the real world?
by Matthew Edwards
24 February 2022
This article was originally published in German on 22 February 2022 at the Hayek Institut.
With matters in the east between Russia and Ukraine still ongoing, any attempt at this point to determine the final repercussions is bound to be buffeted by evolving events. Yet, outside of outcomes on Ukraine and Russia themselves, one of the most interesting reverberations may, perhaps, be felt with European foreign policy – or, more precisely, within the framework that informs the foreign policy of the European Union and some of its member states.
It is, of course, difficult to actually define ‘European’ foreign policy. It’s often used as a shorthand with an apparent assumption that there is a single position, or that Europe is acting as a unified actor. But what does that term really mean? The foreign policies of European countries? The policies of the couple of major countries that have louder voices internationally than others? The foreign policy of the institutions of the European Union, the European Commission and the linked Common Foreign and Security Policy? How the different views of the various EU countries go into the mixing pot in Brussels to present an (allegedly) European policy view? And how to handle the different policy areas that are linked with foreign policy – trade, where the Commission as an institution has competency; defence, largely held at a national level; foreign policy itself, where the picture gets more mixed and varies depending on the activism of the country in question and the particular issue; and so on. And then, in defence especially, how to handle the interaction between the EU, EU institutions, and NATO – especially given the memberships are not the same.
Since the 1990s, one of the more unique ways that the EU, as a body, has tried to function in its foreign policy – writ large, including trade and climate affairs, accepting the changing degrees of competence between the member states and the Commission etc. – is by seemingly assuming that everyone is operating for the common good, that other countries see international politics as a constructive environment for collaboration, that once an agreement is made there would never be any hesitation about implementing it, and that everything can be solved by talking, by coming to a common understanding, a middle ground, that the correct, most equitable position is somewhere between two sides. This is understandable to a degree: it broadly reflects the nature of intra-EU decision making within domestic, intra-EU affairs, and the way policy evolves within the EU institutional architecture, needing as it often does an ultimate consensus between the 27 member states.
However, it is painfully, clearly obvious that this generally does not work for most international matters. Much of the international arena for the last thirty years, since the end of the Cold War, has been an aberration from that which has taken place for centuries prior. States – and even groupings of states – have had their interests and have fought, metaphorically and literally, for them. They engage where, to the extent, and in the manner that it is in their interests to so do. Yes, negotiations take place; yes, agreements are made; but there has always been a hard-edge of realism to the international arena, especially at the ‘harder’ end of foreign policy, where core matters of defence, state unity, and essential interests are considered.
There has often been an unwillingness from the EU to accept this, to accept that confrontation, that stronger pushing back is needed at times, whether on pragmatic grounds of interests or for moral reasons. Partly this is due to the problems of foreign policy within the EU context: Henry Kissinger’s (alleged) question, “Who do I call when I want to call Europe?” remains unanswered and, indeed, unanswerable for the foreseeable future. Despite the creation of the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, decision making rests with the member states in the areas of ‘hard’ foreign policy. Further, the challenges of getting a consensus position on many foreign affairs issues are formidable, especially during periods of crisis when decisions ideally need to be made swiftly and firmly, not adjectives that are often used with EU decision making. The process of coming to a consensus over potential economic sanctions that could be imposed on Russia should she invade Ukraine has been tortuous and, at times, extremely unhelpful in terms of building deterrence. The different interests and positions of member states – notably Germany and Austria on one side, compared to, for example, the Baltic and Scandinavian states, Poland, and Romania, on the other – has been clear. Priorities have been different: concerns over profits and business interests playing against concerns over national security. And, frankly, much of the expertise for dealing with the hard edge of foreign policy does not sit in Brussels: it sits in the national capitals and in Mons, at NATO headquarters.
None of this is new, of course. The foreign policy position building travails of the EU are well known and induce much frustration both within EU member states and for its partners. When issues are slow, within international frameworks, the EU decision making system can work – trade agreements, for example, where the EU has a justified reputation for driving hard deals, are one area, even though the limits of achieving intra-EU consensus in this now seem to have been reached. But when crises happen, when events take place outside of existing frameworks, the EU has often struggled to react as a body, with national capitals taking the lead.
The situation with Russia and Ukraine has emphasised this. Moves for the EU as a body to be involved in talks have been met with the question, “What would the EU’s position be?” – a question that the EU is unable to answer. The positions of different countries have varied substantially. While on one side, Poland, the Baltics, Romania, and the Scandinavian states have acted to support the democratic government in Kiev, often through NATO architecture, on the other the foot-dragging and reluctance from Berlin (for instance) to provide support to Ukraine has been disgusting. An EU position – or rather a position of the institutions of the EU that has been arrived at through consensus – has floundered.
And national capitals have taken the lead, with Paris and Warsaw being especially prominent. So far, so normal. Another crisis that the EU, once again, fails to be able deal with as a body.
Maybe. Or maybe not. Perhaps there are signs that, slowly, the EU institutions – and, importantly, even some of the more passive member states – are finally beginning to recognise that a harder edge is needed and that policy linkages must exist. That actions have to have repercussions. And that Russia’s actions towards Ukraine have crossed a line. Trade and sanctions are the clear area here where there does appear to have finally been a reluctant acceptance from EU institutions that one cannot separate business and trade from international relations. Yes, the process has been tortuous, and but there are signs that the EU institutions are beginning to turn and recognise that business cannot continue as normal.
And, interestingly, there are signs elsewhere as well that some of the patience of at least some European countries is beginning to wear thin. Take the situation in Mali, where the military junta that came to power in a coup has been highly critical of and confrontational towards the French-led European military mission, expelling the French ambassador, inviting in Russian mercenaries, and ordering out Danish troops. This has finally led to an ‘enough is enough’ moment, with Berlin being notably vocal.
Of course, this may just be a momentary blip. Many EU member states have been well aware of the problems that Putin’s Russia poses for many years; yet others have been willing to turn a blind eye. And one can easily ask if the crisis in Ukraine will really make Berlin and Vienna – amongst others – accept that relations with Russia cannot go on as before. After all, if the invasion and occupation of parts of Georgia; the annexation of the Crimea; supporting and arming separatists in Transnistria, Donetsk, Luhansk, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia; shooting down Malaysia Airlines passenger flight MH17; long-standing non-implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and violating others; undertaking massive espionage operations and cyber-attacks; assassinating dissidents and critics; conducting radioactive and chemical weapons poisonings; supporting the Lukashenko regime in Belarus in crack-downs on protestors, etc. did not cause a change, why should this current crisis? There are some who will no doubt be more than happy to press the snooze button again, go back to business as normal, and indulge in some anti-American posturing while benefiting from the security that the U.S. provides.
The proof of any long-term change remains to be seen. Discussions of the European defence architecture are increasingly making their way into EU matters – but discussions and institutional architectures are one thing, actually getting equipment capabilities to the levels needed is quite another. (The EU’s PESCO has been underwhelming, to put it mildly – but then the terms ‘on budget’ and ‘to time’ are not phrases one associates with defence procurement, especially when international projects are concerned). And the question of capability is distinct from that of intent or will. No doubt there will be (more) questions about NATO-EU relations. There will be (continued) foot-dragging from some countries on increasing their defence budgets, despite previous commitments.
But there is now, finally, at least a hope that the institutions of the EU and even some of its most reluctant member states will recognise that the world does not run according to a happy-clappy-let’s-all-be-friends mantra; that it will accept that lines have to be drawn; and that when countries undertake or threaten aggressive actions, countermeasures have to be taken, even if those do cause some economic pain for themselves. And for those countries that profess to be neutral, some uncomfortable questions will be asked: neutrality does not equate with appeasement.
Welcome, Europe, back to the real world.
